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INTRODUCTION: THE COURTS AND SoCiL PROBLEMS

Judicial action dealing with a wide and increasing range of
social problems has drawn analysts' attention at least since Brown
v. Board of Education.' In addition to standard doctrinal criticism,
there has been an increasing examination of the effects of courts'
decisions and, more recently, of courts' capacity to deal with social
problems. Some analysts now claim that the courts have been tendered not only new but also different problems that they cannot
handle effectively because the cases require judges and juries to
digest new types of information and because the courts cannot properly implement their decisions.
Two examples of the numerous statements of the problem suffice here. Stuart Scheingold argues that because litigation is cumbersome and tends to compartmentalize and fragment problems, it
* A.B., Antioch College, 1959; M.A., 1961, Ph.D., 1962, University of Oregon. Professor
of Political Science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale until 1978; Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Albany beginning in 1978. The author is Program Director of the Law and Social Science Program, National Science Foundation, 19781979. The views expressed by the author are not the views of the National Science Foundation.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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must be used with particular care. "The lawyer can feel reasonably
confident about using litigation to force delivery on existing legal
commitments," he maintains, but expectations about new policy
should be more modest because "judicial policy initiatives emerge
erratically and unpredictably." '2 Because expectations are created
by rules and because patterns of interest develop around those rules,
courts "cannot treat their commitments lightly. ' 3 Moreover, courts
are "only modestly endowed with coercive capabilities;" even if they
can deal with defiant individuals, they are unlikely to be able to
bring large groups or powerful organizations into line.
Robert G. Dixon, Jr., recently phrased the problem in this way:
New principles or values judicially selected for special protection are broad,
and they intersect ambiguously with the details of industrial, social, and polit-

ical life. Their just application depends on factual appraisal to ascertain
whether the principle itself is being served or hurt by the statute in question
in any particular case. A legislative-type process of factfinding and an admin-

istrative process of mixed rulemaking and adjudication are needed to illumine
new principles before they can be handled with assurance-modes of operation
not transferable to the judicial function without risk to the "neutral" judging
function itself.-

A long and honorable tradition of normative argument supports
a limited role for the judiciary. 6 Although it is possible to approach
judicial capacity with a high degree of objectivity, social science
literature on the subject is relatively scarce. Only a thin line divides
evenhanded analysis from thinly veiled apologies for a self-restraint
preferred because of the conservative results produced. The line is
especially easy to cross in the social climate of the 1970's, in which
support for civil rights has cooled and the Supreme Court has become less willing to provide new remedies for social ills. 7 Yet social

scientists have an obligation not to cross the line; they can avoid
doing so only by defining precisely the question to be addressed,
developing a framework for its examination, carefully collecting

their data, and then systematically analyzing it.
2. S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PuBIc POLICY AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 118 (1974).

3. Id. at 111.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Dixon, The 'New' Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomonon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 43, 73.
6. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
PoLmcs 111 (1962); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1 (1959).
7. See S. WAsSY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE: FROM E WARREN COURT TO TH BURGER
COURT (1976). Recent arguments against the "imperial judiciary" are R. BERGER, GovamMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRNSFORMATION OF THE FORTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); L. GRAGLZA,
DISASTER BY DECREE (1976).
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Attempts at explaining judicial capacity often have failed because of indecision about whether to focus only on the courts or to
compare the courts with the other branches of government. Courts
look much better when their capacities are compared with those of
other governmental institutions than when viewed in isolation.
There has also been an unwillingness to give full recognition to the
context in which the courts find themselves, particularly the position of enforcing civil rights legislation and other Great Society
social programs of the 1960's. Despite the Warren Court's "civil
liberties revolution," based on the fourteenth amendment, many of
the issues faced by the judiciary in the last decade, such as women's
rights and employment discrimination, involve primarily statutory
interpretation, hardly a new judicial task.
Because, as de Tocqueville pointed out, American social, economic, philosophical, and political issues are cast in legal form, the
issue of judicial capacity to deal with such issues remains the same,
while the substance of policy varies over time. In the words of Judge
William Doyle of the Tenth Circuit: "The problem of judicial involvement in social policy is thus a matter of long standing."' Sometimes, as in the argument that led to passage of the Judges Bill of
1925,' which gave the Supreme Court its certiorari jurisdiction, or
in the more recent debate about revising our federal appellate court
system,"0 the issue has arisen as a question of overload; there are
thought to be more cases than can be processed properly. At other
times, as in Lawrence Friedman's portrayal of the courts and contract law at the end of the nineteenth century, the focus has been
more centrally on whether courts are inappropriate for dealing with
particular types of questions:
Courts were not equipped to handle business disputes as rapidly and efficiently
as a brawling capitalist economy demanded.. . . [Jiudges were judges, not

mediators. They named winners and losers. ... Moreover, judges simply
lacked enough business acumen. They were trained in law, not in business;
certainly not in the business details and jargon of a thousand fields."

At still other times, the two elements of overload and basic judicial
8. Doyle, Social Science Evidence in Court Cases, in EDucATioN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND
Tm JUDIcIAL PaocEss 11 (R.Anson & R. Rist eds. 1977).
9. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415,43 Stat. 936 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 12541257 (1970)).

10. COMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYS'TEM ("Hruska Commission"), STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PaocEDuREs: RECOMMEmATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975).
11. L. FiumAm, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 465 (1973). Friedman argues that, as a

result of these judicial shortcomings, those in contract disputes stayed out of court. They
worked out their own problems or went to arbitration, and "the business of running economy
and society drained out into other hands." Id. at 338.
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capacity have coalesced, as in present efforts to divert certain categories of cases, such as small claims or uncontested divorces, from
the courts into alternative methods of dispute settlement.

H. THE HOROWITZ STUDY
Donald Horowitz's The Courts and Social Policy is a serious
effort to deal with the question of judicial capacity. Horowitz talks
first of the expansion of judicial responsibility, which he thinks is a
departure from the traditional exercise of the judicial function, and
then explores the sources of this growth, particularly expansive statutory interpretation. He believes that courts do not do well at
interpreting the mixes of statutes, regulations, and local arrangements with which they are faced more and more frequently. Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.,' 2 which invalidated non-job related tests with
discriminatory effects, and Lau v. Nichols,'3 which held that failure
to remedy Chinese children's English language deficiencies deprived them of the opportunity to be educated, are used as examples. Horowitz then discusses attributes of adjudication, focusing
particularly upon courts' ability to handle social facts and to implement their decisions.
Giving particular attention to the problems courts face when
two target populations, for example, the lower courts and the police,
are affected by a court ruling or when target populations are at some
distance from the courts, he examines whether some policy areas,
issues, or target populations are more appropriate than others for
judicial intervention. After discussing the limitations of litigation,
law, and social science and the implementation of judicial decisions,
he briefly compares courts with the other branches of government
on the basis of the setting of agendas, their reliance on staff, the
unrepresentativeness of parties, the scope of their decisions, the
bargaining to reach those decisions, and the ability to oversee the
impact of their decisions. Horowitz concludes with the assertion
that the distinctiveness of the judicial process makes the courts
unfit for much of government's important work, but warns against
augmenting judicial capacity for fear that the courts will become too
much like other institutions.
The author illustrates his principal themes with four case studies that constitute the core of the book. His studies of the Philadelphia Area-Wide Council case, 14 in which the federal court for the
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
13. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
14. North City Area-Wide Council v. Romney, No. 69-1909 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1969),
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania was called upon to interpret the
meaning of "citizen participation" in the federal Model Cities program, and of Hobson v. Hansen,5 in which the federal district court
for the District of Columbia twice in a four-year period dealt with
inequalities in expenditures by the District of Columbia for education, focus primarily upon the courts' ability to deal with social
facts. The author examines In re Gault,1 1in which the United States
Supreme Court extended due process protections in juvenile court
proceedings, and Mapp v. Ohio,17 in which the Court imposed upon
the states the fourth amendment exclusionary rule for improperly
seized evidence, in terms of the implementation of the decisions and
their impact.
With the Area-Wide Council case, Horowitz explores the Model
Cities program nationally, the Area-Wide Council-Model Cities
administration conflict, and the downgrading of citizen-dominated
corporations. With roughly half the study devoted to such
"environment," litigation receives relatively brief attention, except
for the Third Circuit's ruling strongly favoring citizen participation.
In Hobson v. Hansen, the district judge used an "overriding
justification" test for policies with negative effects on minorities and
focused his attention primarily on equality of per pupil expenditures
for teachers' salaries. Horowitz's attention is drawn to changes in
the District's schools between Hobson I, which examined resource
inequality but did not order direct dollar equalization, and Hobson
/, in which the question, with counsel playing an important role,
was narrowed to equalization of teacher costs at the elementary
level. Implementation of Hobson IT, we find, took place largely
through transfer of special resources teachers, and was affected by
the presence of Title I (Elementary and Secondary Education Act)
funds.
In dealing with Gault, Horowitz focuses on the relation between
juvenile court procedures and juvenile delinquency, particularly the
belief that procedural informality hindered offender rehabilitation.
With Mapp, he stresses that evaluations of the case depend on
which element of its rationale-deterrence of improper police berev'd, 428 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1970), on remand, 329 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd, 456
F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub noma. Rizzo v. North City Area-Wide Council, 406
U.S. 963 (1972), on remand, No. 69-1909 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1972), affld, 460 F.2d 1326 (3d
Cir. 1972).
15. 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967), appealdismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968), 269 F. Supp.
401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), further
relief ordered,320 F. Supp. 409, 720 (D.D.C. 1970), 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971).
16. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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havior or principled refusal to condone improper police activity-is
emphasized. He concludes from studies of the unstated assumptions
about the deterrence argument that the police are concerned with
convicting people, not merely with harassing them, and that both
prosecutors' actions and lower court decisions can affect the police.
The Courts and Social Policy is flawed in a number of important respects. Despite the impression that it represents the state of
the art on how to study the capacity of the judiciary to resolve social
problems, the book is primarily an argumentative legal brief, not a
balanced examination of the problem. It has the surface quality of
objectivity, but on the whole is not objective, embodying among its
biases an orientation favoring government programs. 8 Although the
case studies are of some interest and although the author handles
judicial treatment of social science well, the book does little to advance our knowledge and understanding of the inherent limitations
of courts. The existing literature, which contains more balanced
statements of much of what Horowitz has to say,"9 is inadequately
treated. Nor is Horowitz's work a solid doctrinal analysis of the type
2
we have come to expect from law professors. 1
This reviewer's basic criticism of the book is that Horowitz
seems to be unclear about both his purpose and his conclusions. The
reader is likely to come away from the book unsure about whether
Horowitz wants to improve matters or leave them as they are. The
author adopts no systematic framework even for his case studies,
and his argument is difficult to follow. He is unsure whether to
assess the capacities of courts by themselves or to compare them
with other policy-making institutions, and his infrequent comparisons are inadequately developed. Much of his analysis is composed
of arguments and selective quotations, and he often ignores important facets of the available literature. He defers analysis to the last
chapter instead of closely analyzing each of his cases in turn, and
his analysis contains disappointingly few references to the case
studies. All of this results in a presentation of much underanalyzed
and unanalyzed material and mere assertions of propositions quite
disconnected from the data base upon which they are supposed to
18. Horowitz assumes, for example, that HUD was correct in the Area.Wide Council
case, with the Third Circuit interfering with HUD's program.
19. See notes 65 & 160 infra.
20. For an example of tightly reasoned analysis of the Supreme Court's use of the
fourteenth amendment, see Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality: Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination,62 CoREU L. REv. 494 (1977). Dixon deals
with some of the points raised by Horowitz, e.g., the relation between right and remedy. Id.
at 509, 542.
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rest. Thus it is not surprising that Horowitz finds exactly what he
sets out to find. The book comes close to being merely a polemic
against the use of the courts by people who feel they cannot achieve
desirable social policy-or even simple fairness-through other governmental institutions. Accepting most of the traditional separation
of powers thinking about the courts, Horowitz, ignoring the ideological biases of the traditional exercise of the judicial function, which
often served to protect those in positions of authority, assumes its
validity.
Horowitz does not begin with a thorough search of the relevant
literature from which he might have borrowed or derived hypotheses
about the adjudicatory process and from which he might have derived guidance both in the choice of cases examined and in his
analysis. 21 Although he acknowledges the existence of such hypotheses, he "deliberately avoid[s]" them, a practice that is inexcusable in social science, which is meant to be cumulative. If Horowitz believes earlier explanations were ineffective, he has an obligation to explain why. Despite this avoidance of relevant hypotheses, he claims "to build on what we know"23 and says he chose
cases for his case studies on the basis of that which was familiar
about the adjudicatory process, a course of action bound merely to
reinforce conventional wisdom. Here as elsewhere, plausible argument does not necessarily make good social science. To confirm-or
not disconfirm-what one has hypothesized is not per se improper;
what is unacceptable is to foreordain one's conclusions. The author's method of proceeding makes it almost inevitable that he
would find the capacity of the judicial process to handle social policy weak at best.
In addition, Horowitz's statements frequently are inadequately
substantiated. For example, his assertion that "[m]uch judicial
activity has occurred quite independent of Congress and the bureaucracy, and sometimes quite contrary to their announced policies"'" is certainly worth exploring, but it is not equivalent to a
generalization based on data. In claiming that "the wealthy invariably want the courts to strike down action the other branches have
taken" while "the disadvantaged often ask the courts to take action
21.

Examples of the literature that Horowitz acknowledges but ignores include S.

WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UMNTED STATES SuPREmE CouRT: SoME PERSPECTIVES 243-68

(1970),

and Grossman, The Supreme Court and Social Chang. 31 AM. BEHAviOAL ScIENTIST 535,
545-49 (1970).
22. D. Honowrrz, THE CouRTs AND SocrL POLICY 62 (1977).

23. Id. at 64.
24. Id. at 5-6.
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the other branches have decided not to take,"" Horowitz ignores the
many instances in which the disadvantaged have attacked existing
government policies, such as welfare regulations26 and prison rules. 7
In addition, in a laundry list of judicial intervention purported to
demonstrate the "considerable expansion of judicial responsibility"
into areas traditionally thought to be inappropriate for judicial activity,m he fails to indicate the frequencies with which such intervention occurs, something that social scientists quite properly have
come to expect. Other empirical statements unsupported by data
include the comments that judges "tire quickly of repeated sequences of litigation before them," 2 that "the question of representativeness [of cases] rarely occurs" to judges," and that "the courts
recurrently assume . . . that they are working with more or less
uniform situations for which a single rule will suffice. 31 Certainly

judges do complain from the bench that certain cases ought not to
be before them and may be unhappy if a case returns to court when
the underlying controversy might have been resolved elsewhere, 32
but that is hardly the same as their tiring quickly.33 Had Horowitz
interviewed judges, he might have had a firm basis for this and other
statements, but no such data is evident. Nor are selective quotations from law review articles a substitute which satisfies the canons
of social science, because they are often written to lobby for a particular point of view. Yet Horowitz uses one citation to an Alabama
Law Review article to support a claim that there has been a
"withering of the mootness doctrine" and another, to a VirginiaLaw
Review article, for the "abundant evidence" as to the intent of the
sponsors of the statutory provision at issue in Griggs.
25. Id. at 11, n.41.
26. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 18 (1969).
27. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
28. HoRowiTZ, supra note 22, at 4-5.

29. Id. at 68.
30. Id. at 268.
31.
32.

Id. at 261.
For a discussion of "repeater" litigation and docket-management in the Supreme
Court, see S. WAsBY, A. D'AMATO, & R. MLrRAuxR, DESEGREGATION ROM BRowN To ALEXANDER: AN EXPLORATION op SUPREME COURT STRATEGIES passim (1977) [hereinafter WASBY,
D'mwro, & METRAILER].
33. Nor is the point proved by citation of the famous "time-chart" article, Hart,
Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,73 HAnv. L. REv. 84 (1959), and the Freund study
group's recommendations for a National Court of Appeals, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT
OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREmE CoUtr (1972), reprintedin 59 A.B.A.J.
139 (1973), which bear instead on whether judges have inadequate time to carry out their

duties.
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Inadequate analysis is another problem for Horowitz. As early
as the first chapter he asserts that the Court's decisions in Griggs
v. Duke Power Co.Y and in Lau v.Nichols" depart from the language and legislative history of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. 31 He suggests that the Griggs Court, in considering the
provision in Title VII insulating ability tests to screen potential
employees if "not designed, intended or used to discriminate" on
racial grounds, misinterpreted the phrase "used to discriminate." 7
Horowitz says the phrase is quite clear, but if this were so, under
the plain meaning doctrine judges would not resort to legislative
history. Moreover, if the Court seriously misinterpreted Congress'
will, one might ask why, although reversals of the Supreme Court's
statutory interpretation rulings occur with some frequency, 38 nothing has been done to overturn the decision; no evidence is presented
that reversal legislation was even introduced. Horowitz simply is not
justified in concluding that "Griggs cannot be understood as a traditional exercise in statutory exegesis""- or that "no one could mistake
[Griggs and Lau] for 'interstitial' statutory interpretation." 4° In
Griggs, Congress had passed a statute and when that statute was
tested in court, the judges gave some meaning to it, hardly an unusual exercise of judicial power. In Lau, the statute came to court
after development of HEW regulations, also hardly an unusual situation when the statute authorizes governmental agencies to define
the provisions of the statute. Horowitz, who also argues that the
HEW regulations "enlarged" the statute, adopts a crabbed view of
discrimination (failure to provide equal treatment), which would
have left San Francisco's Chinese children failing to understand
classes taught in English. Nor does he show any appreciation of
anti-Oriental discrimination in that city, an important social fact
bearing on the controversy underlying the case.
In addition to these failings, the author's case studies are poorly
chosen, poorly designed, and poorly executed. One gets not an examination of the cases through previously developed hypotheses or
systematic testing of plausible, competing generalizations, but
34. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
35. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
36. HoRowrrz, supra note 22, at 14-17.
37. Id. at 14-15.
38. Note, CongressionalReversal of Supreme Court Decision: 1945-1957, 71 HARv. L.
REV. 1324 (1958). Krislov notes 50 instances in which Congress reversed the Court between
1944 and 1960. S. KiusLov, THE SuPREMe.CouRT iNTHE POUnCAL PROCESS 143 (1965).
39. HoRowrrz, supra note 22, at 15.
40. Id. at 17.
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rather an unsatisfactory hodgepodge of facts and illustrations designed to reinforce a point of view adopted in advance.
Horowitz's cases are sweeping decisions in which:
social and "political reality" might diverge from "judicial reality"; where social science was involved; where there was an unfamiliar government program
in litigation and where there was a familiar one; where the follow-up abilities
of the courts were tested; where major national policy was being laid down;

and where local disputes were being settled but with wider ramifications. I was
interested in finding decisions that'reallocated resources as well as those that
asked institutions to modify their behavior, decisions that seemed to impose
purely procedural requirements and those that demanded substantive change.

I was looking for different numbers and types of target populations: lower
courts and bureaucracies, organizations that function in close proximity to the
courts and those that operate at some remove from them.4'
He says his cases are representative, not in a statistical sense, but
in not being aberrational and asserts that "frequency is not an issue
in this study."4z Perhaps "such problems are easier to identify by
illustration than by description,"43 but how is one to know whether
the cases are aberrational without some idea of the frequency with
which they occur? If the problems to which Horowitz directs his
readers' attention occur only infrequently, then the issue of judicial
capacity would be of much smaller dimension than he makes it out
to be. Even if his cases are unrepresentative, they could be analyzed
usefully. Social scientists have long known that analysis of deviant
cases can be fruitful if one knows the baseline. As Horowitz concedes, the case-study method does not allow a projection of frequency,44 but one could make assertions about judicial incapacity
if the cases were properly chosen. Apart from the question of frequency, the cases are unrepresentative in that only one of the four
is a trial court ruling, despite the obviously larger role that trial
courts play in dealing with social facts, and two are Supreme Court
decisions. None are state court decisions, implying, inaccurately,
that they do not face these problems.
However selected, the cases should have been treated systematically based on a common framework. His failure to do so thus
41. Id. at 65-66.
42. Id. at 63. Horowitz also does not support with frequency data his argument that
statutes provide a major source of the growth of judicial activity. An examination of the
annual November issues of the HarvardLaw Review, which report on the year's Supreme
Court activity, indicate the change in the mix of cases in the Supreme Court. See also Casper
& Posner, A Study of the Supreme Court's Caseload, 3 J. LEaL STUM. 339 (1974) and
Griswold, The Supreme Court's Case Load: Civil Rights and Other Problems, 1973 U. ILL.
L.F. 615.
43. HoRowrrz, supra note 22, at 298.
44. Id. at 63.
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decreases the usefulness of his case studies. Horowitz talks of

"mov[ing] backward into the environment" before discussing relevant litigation, but only for the Area-Wide Council case does he
do so. With each of the other three cases, Horowitz plunges almost
immediately into the case at hand. The Hobson case study, which
focuses on the changes in the District of Columbia schools between
Hobson I and Hobson 1, is primarily an opinionated view of the
defects of the latter ruling. In his study of Mapp, in which a discussion of the Court's pre-Mapp search and seizure doctrine would have
provided a more complete understanding of the Court's rationale,
there is no attention to such crucial cases as Wolf v. Colorado,4" in
which the Court applied the fourth amendment, but not the exclu47 in which some
sionary rule, to the states, and Irvine v. California,
of the justices' impatience with police misbehavior was quite evident. Still another disparity is Horowitz's data base. Only in the
Hobson study does Horowitz rely upon interviews with lawyers who
participated in the case, thus minimizing the importance of lawyers'
roles and litigation strategy in the cases he examines.
III.

JuDiciAL CAPACITY AND LITIGATION CHARACTERISTICS

A.

The Growth of Social Policy Litigation

The first element of Horowitz's basic argument about litigation
characteristics is that courts formulate social policy more frequently
today than in the past. He thinks that the dispute between judges
and legislatures, long settled in England, is still an open contest in
this country, with judges increasing the scope of their power, having
departed from the traditional exercise of judicial restraint." Courts,
he contends, are now involved in "decisions that would earlier have

been thought unfit for adjudication,"" and much recent judicial
action "has occurred quite independent of Congress and the bureaucracy, and sometimes quite contrary to their announced poli45. Id. at 65.
46. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
47. 347 U.S. 128 (1954). For a discussion of Irvine, see Westin, Bookies and "Bugs" in
California:Judicial Control of Police Practices,in TN UsEs o POwER: 7 CAsEs INAIzmIncAN
PoLmcs 117 (A. Westin ed. 1962).
48. That judicial power has expanded is not a new claim and a statement that "the
courts have tended to move from the byways onto the highways of policymaking" is hardly
innovative. Hoaowrrz, supranote 22, at 9. Charges of judicial supremacy and judicial policymaking long have been leveled at the courts. Critics often have complained that courts were
meddling in matters that were none of their business-economic regulation until the late
1930's, civil liberties more recently.
49. Id. at 4.
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cies." 50 Because individual cases have become subordinated to judicial policymaking, he believes, "there is somewhat less institutional
differentiation today than two decades ago."'"
At bottom, however, Horowitz is not clear on what is new. At
one point, he writes that "the types of decisions being made by the
various institutions-their scope and level of generality-seem to be
converging somewhat, though the processes by which the decisions
are made and the outcomes of those processes may be quite different. .... -"2Yet this statement does not indicate whether it is the
results that are convergent or the processes that led to them. Horowitz's argument seems to depend on the latter, but his apparent
dislike of the results of some social policy litigation leaves him in a
quandary.
Horowitz seems to be saying that current social policy litigation
poses fundamental issues about adjudication, not merely because it
is new, but because it is different in kind from past litigation. The
Area-Wide Council and Hobson cases, he contends, are "far from
the ordinary run of judicial experience," 5 3 although the "ordinary
run" is never identified.54 To blame judges for inability to handle
litigation because of lack of familiarity with the subject matter is
one thing. Few governmental institutions do well with new problems, but time and preparation can overcome that difficulty. It is
quite another thing to claim that the basic characteristics of adjudication are at stake in these new cases. Yet by lumping together
newness and other elements of the new social policy litigation, Horowitz obscures just what is at the heart of the problem or how much
each element contributes to the problem. 5
The courts' "abrupt departure" from the past, Horowitz says,
results from an "aggregate of features,"56 one of which is that courts
are increasingly called upon "to judge action very much in progress.

' 57 Yet

this is hardly new. Courts often are called upon to issue

injunctions in situations in which time is of the essence, such as
stockholder suits to prevent mergers; if they fail to act quickly,
50. Id. at 5-6.
51. Id. at 20.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 171.
54. School desegregation cases resulting in complex remedies have occurred in virtually
every major metropolitan area. The compensatory education plans now approved for Detroit
are only the newest generation of those remedies. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
55. A similar difficulty is created when Horowitz presents a typology of issues, but does
not say how each type.of issue might affect the judicial process.
56. HoRowrrz, supra note 22, at 5.
57. Id. at 92.
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unscrambling the eggs later is exceptionally difficult. To justify his
argument, Horowitz calls particular attention to courts' willingness
to expedite injunction hearing schedules, although he does not make
clear what is wrong about such action" and elsewhere has noted that
the status quo is not likely to be preserved without prompt injunctive relief.
Another abrupt departure from the past that Horowitz sees is
that decisions now frequently not only stop governmental action,
but also require that something be done, "nothing new in principle,
but new in degree," with the "character of the demand for action"
changed as a result." Remedies used by judges in social policy cases,
according to Horowitz, "are reminiscent of the kinds of programs
adopted by legislature and executives." 60
Horowitz's insistence on distinguishing between judicial ordering that something be done and ordering that something be stopped,
"between foreclosing an alternative and choosing one, between constraining and commanding,""1 poses a fundamental conceptual
problem. An order to halt a particular action may constrain a governmental body somewhat more than an order to do something. If
the governmental agency is told to stop what is at the heart of its
program, however, it is as fully constrained as if a positive injunction had been issued. Similarly, a series of decisions each of which
orders the cessation of a particular governmental course of conduct
and in the aggregate leaves perhaps only one option open might be
no less constraining than a directive to undertake specific action.
Indeed, Horowitz himself seems implicitly to recognize that there is
little difference between acting and not acting when he admits that
the executive and legislative branches "often effectively say no by
saying nothing." 2 Yet there is a difference between the forms of
action which different societal interests require to gain their ends.
58. Id. at 11. The Third Circuit's Area-Wide Council ruling was ineffective because the
Council had not sought an injunction pending appeal; too much already had happened that
could not be undone.
59. Hoiowrrz,supra note 22, at 7,11 n.41. Despite his criticism of courts for requiring
particular action of other branches of the government, he attacks the Supreme Court's decision in Lau v.Nichols because, although it did not require any particular action, the Court
said "that inaction was forbidden." Id. at 16. The basis for Horowitz's criticism apparently
is that the decision has given rise to a controversy between those who wanted bilingualbicultural education and those who thought training in English as a second language to be
appropriate. For a discussion of the controversy, see Waugh & Koon, Breakthroughfor Bilingual Education: Lau v. Nichols and the San Francisco School System, 6 Civ. R.Dir. no. 4,
at 18 (1974).
60. HoRowrrz, supranote 22, at 7.
61. Id. at 19.
62. Id. at 22.
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Business interests seeking injunctions against economic regulation
legislation require only an injunction against an act to be successful.
However, disadvantaged social groups seeking equality of treatment
from the government or seeking to have the government enforce
existing rules need more; the government must be forced to act
where it has neglected or refused to do so. Were the courts not to
act, the disadvantaged would remain disadvantaged or would become more so; the results would not be neutral. The type of action
the courts dictate may have changed, but it had to if the courts were
not to remain largely instruments of those already in possession of
economic and governmental power.
B. Basic Litigation Characteristics
Horowitz examines the characteristics of litigation to stress the
weakness of the adjudicatory process as a policymaking tool. The
basic problem with his approach, however, is that he never develops
a clear definition of "judicial." He does not do this even when he
asserts that the amount of readjustment in social policy cases raises
the question of the degree to which such problems are "judicial." 3
The problem becomes obvious when, to show that the worst cases
come to court, he uses cases before state antidiscrimination commissions, which he says are like the courts because they are quasijudicial in nature. 4 Although admittedly, as J. Woodford Howard
has observed, "neither the sole nor necessarily the most frequent use
of adjudication is located in the judiciary,"65 Horowitz does not
return to these commissions to examine any differences in context
and operation between them and the courts, an exercise that might
help explain the meaning of the concept "judicial."
Had Horowitz confronted the literature suggesting that law is
not a distinct social phenomenon and other literature that attempts
to differentiate law from other institutional means of social control,
he might have forced himself to define his terms. Malcolm Feeley,
asking "whether law is so distinctive a social phenomena that it can
serve as a core concept in the development of general social theory,"
concludes that it probably cannot.8 "Law," Feeley observes, "does
not perform a unique social function, nor is it a singular form of
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 42.
65. Howard, Adjudication Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variation
on the Separation of Powers, 18 J. PuB. L. 339, 340 (1969).
66. Feeley, The Concept of Laws in Social Science: A Critique and Notes on an Expanded View, 10 LAw & Soe'y REv. 497, 501 (1976).
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social control."67 Legal rules "are only one of a number of systems
of rules, often overlapping and entwined, which shape people's aspirations and actions, and by which they are judged and resolve their
troubles.""8
Despite such arguments, most of us are believers. We do see law
as something different from other social phenomena. This belief,
which is part of the so-called myth of rights, in turn has its effects.
According to Scheingold: "The law is real, but it is also a figment
of our imaginations. Like all fundamental social institutions it casts
a shadow of popular belief that may ultimately be more significant,
albeit more difficult to comprehend, than the authorities, rules and
penalties that we ordinarily associate with law." 6 If law is real in
this sense and if by extension there are courts, specialized social
institutions that interpret law in particular ways, then we must take
pains to define courts' quintessential elements if we are to study
them. Horowitz, however, chooses not to do so, causing confusion
in the remainder of his analysis.
A point of orientation is provided by Theodore Becker, who has
defined a court as:
(1)a man or body of men (2) with power to decide a dispute, (3)before whom
the parties or advocates or their surrogates present the facts of the dispute and
cite existent, expressed, primary normative principles (in statutes, constitutions, rules, previous cases) that (4) are applied by that man or those men, (5)
who believe that they should listen to the presentation of facts and apply such
cited normative principles impartially, objectively, or with detachment...
and (6) that they may so decide, and (7) as an independent body.7'
Independence and impartiality are particularly important. If our
standards were that persons called judges had to be fully independent of either their society or their own values, there would be no
judicial independence "and thus there would be no courts." A judge
is impartial, however, as he or she "is dependent upon the law
(bound to interpret and apply it). ' '7'
Others have identified key elements of legality similar to
Becker's conceptualization, emphasizing in particular the use of
reason and deliberateness or, in sum, formality. A legal solution
thus is one characterized by the taking of time "for deliberateaction, for articulate definition of the issues, for a decision which is
67. Id.
68. Id.

69.

SCHEINGOLD,

supra note 2, at 3.

70. T. BcKmc, CompAmivE JUDiCiAL POLmcs: THe PoLmcAL FuNoriONINGS OF COURTS
13 (1970).
71. Id. at 144.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:727

subject to public scrutiny and which is objective in the sense that
it reflects an explicit community judgment and not merely an explicitly personal judgment."7 2 The point is not which of these elements, if any, Horowitz should have adopted; the point is that he
casually uses the term "judicial" without making any effort to
grapple with these conceptualizations.
In one of his principal themes, Horowitz says that the judicial
process is "prone to carve up related transactions and to treat as
separate those events and relationships that are intertwined in social life."7 3 Legal reasoning, he asserts, is nonprobabilistic, "everylast-case reasoning, rather than run-of-the-cases reasoning.""4
Judges, he insists, are preoccupied with individual cases and seldom
think about the representativeness of cases before them. The result
is piecemeal policy making, "hardly an optimal mode of general
decisionmaking." 5 This "expenditure of social resources on individual complaints, one at a time," which provides the "distinctiveness
of the judicial process," he concludes, "is what unfits the courts for
much of the important work of government." 6
Horowitz does not realize that incremental decisions characterize most policymaking. 77 Administrative agencies also are criticized
for failing to make more frequent use of rulemaking and for placing
predominant reliance on a case-by-case approach. On the other
hand, policy made one-case-at-a-time does not necessarily imply ad
hoc decisionmaking. Judges often do think down the line to the next
case, often in the form of questions from the bench about the implications of their rulings78 and often in a more formal manner. For
example, the federal courts of appeals have developed procedures
for dealing with cases that raise common issues: panels with similar
cases must communicate with each other to avoid conflict, 7 and en
72. H. BERmN & W. GRFIER, Th NATRu AND F N nONS OF LAW 26 (3d ed. 1972).
73. HoRowrrz, supra note 22, at 260.
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. at 268.
76. Id. at 298.
77. The classic statement on incrementalism is Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling
Through," 19 PuB. AD. Rav. 79 (1959). For the most cogent argument that best describes
judicial decisionmaking, see Shapiro, Stability and Change in JudicialDecision.Making:
Incrementalism or Stare Decisis, 2 LAW INTRANsTON Q. 134, 155 (1965): "The theory of
incrementalism may explain, or at least describe, the phenomena of stability and gradual
change in law just as well or better than stare decisis. .... "
78. WAsBy, D'AmTo, & Mmwmm, supra note 32, at 367-68, provides some examples
with respect to the Rachel and Peacock removal cases. City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966); Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
79. See Wasby, CommunicationWithin the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: The View
from the Bench, 8 GowEN GATE U.L. REV. (forthcoming, 1978).
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banc courts may be convened when a broad new rule is required.
Moreover, in order to focus on underlying policy issues, the Supreme
Court has encouraged petitioners for certiorari to emphasize the
broad relevance of their cases, and the Court has often joined cases
into groups;"0 as Horowitz notes, the clerk designated as "E.C."
(Escobedo cases) those raising what became the Mirandaquestion
after Escobedo was decided. Nor does Horowitz take into account
rules developed by the federal courts to apply to certain classes of
cases" or the development of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Furthermore,
although Horowitz admits that not all judicial decisions are made
on an ad hoc basis when he refers to the "increasing subordination
of the individual case in judicial policymaking," 2 with justice suffering as a result, he does not reconcile this theme with his stress
on the case-by-case approach to policymaking.
Horowitz never seems sure where he wishes to place blame for
the faults he finds in adjudication. He places most of it on the
judges, who are, he says generalists as a result of recruitment, socialization, and pressures from the flow of their work.83 Although his
argument seems to be that the difficulties are systemic, that is,
inherent in the judicial system, he fails to recognize that they may
simply result from inadequate preparation and training, factors to
which we have only recently begun to give serious attention.
Problems caused by "impatience or inexperience or inadvertence" 84 are not systemic; similarly, if judges "often have little tolerance for advance detail" because they "are not recruited for their
managerial interest or aptitude,"85 training can be provided. 8 Ignoring Chief Justice Burger's suggestion that many lawyers arguing in
80. WASBY, D'AMATO, & MamAlLFa, supra note 32, at 16, 38, 54, 64-67, 303, 311, 325,
333, 335, 414-15.
81. See, e.g., General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in
Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D.
133 (M.D. Mo. 1968).
82. Hoaowrrz, supra note 22, at 9.
83. Yet there is some specialization which does not meet the eye. Horowitz argues that
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, "the continuous reshuffling of panel members leaves little
room for a division of labor or the development of spheres of expertise." Id. at 30. Even in
the larger circuits, judges monitor and comment on cases of interest from other panels in
particular areas of the law in which they have some expertise. For example, one judge whose
specialty before taking the bench was antitrust reads and comments on all the antitrust cases
in his circuit.
84. Id. at 139.
85. Id. at 266.
86. For example, through seminars at the Federal Judicial Center and the National
College of the Judiciary.
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federal court are not competent, Horowitz fails to acknowledge their
responsibility for the deficiencies in our system of adjudication. He
does acknowledge the lawyers' role in formulating the issue in
Hobson v. Hansen, but fails to carry his analysis one step further
to consider whether the attorneys, by not anticipating the effects of
Hobson I, should bear as much responsibility as the judge for the
court's inability to predict Hobsonlf.In his discussion of Area-Wide
Council, he says that there is "no evidence" that any of the background underlying the "widespread participation" language of the
Model Cities Act was brought to the court's attention. 87 This, of
course, was the responsibility of the lawyers in the case. Horowitz
makes the strange argument that the lawyers in the case had no
reason to be "versed in the nuances of various social programs that
occupy the time of politicians and bureaucrats." s Why else, one
might ask, do we provide attorneys for government agencies? Are
lawyers for the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
be less responsible for staying abreast of developments affecting
their agency than are judges?"
C. The Relative Capacity of Courts
Because Horowitz fails to compare courts systematically with
legislatures and administrative agencies, his treatment of the differences between the institutions is wholly inadequate. Quite early he
claims that "there is as of now no basis for firm conclusions about
the relative capacities of our institutions.""0 At the book's end, when
the author concedes that other institutions are also flawed ("there
is plenty of incapacity for officials to share"91 ), he says that the
question of "relative institutional capacity" has "stalked" the
book 12 It is more appropriate to say that it lags far behind. To

demonstrate the incapacity of courts to solve social problems does
87. HoRowrrz, supranote 22, at 88. It appears, however, that Horowitz did not examine
the briefs to ascertain what information was given the court.
88. Id.
89. The government's attorneys at times lack even more basic information. In a recent
case against a county official charged with fraud and false swearing, neither an assistant
United States Attorney nor his superior knew whether a local government could use Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) employees for in.kind matching contributions or
for work regularly done, although the case apparently turned on those matters. Whatever the
other complexities of CETA, those were fundamental questions to which answers could have
been easily obtained. Moreover, the judges, while modest about their knowledge, obviously
knew more about CETA than did the attorneys. United States v. Anderson, Nos. 77-1647,
77-1648 (8th Cir. argued December 12, 1977).
90. Honowrrz, supra note 22, at 24.
91. Id. at 293.
92. Id. at 294.
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not at the same time demonstrate whether the other branches of
government would do better. If all policymaking bodies lack capacity, one's prescriptions will be quite different than they would be if
only the courts are unable to solve social policy problems.
Horowitz regularly fails to see mistakes committed by the other
branches. When he says, "[t]he record suggests that the courts are
better equipped with machinery to discover the past than to forecast
the future,"' 3 he writes in apparent ignorance of the military's renown for fighting the last war and economists' efforts to avoid last
decade's recession. He notes that courts have difficulty making advance estimates of the magnitude or direction of the effects of their
decisions, but does not mention the failures of legislatures and executive agencies to predict effectively. Judicial correction of policy is
intermittent, we are told, but there is no recognition that agencies
charged with enforcing legislation do not engage in continuous monitoring. Judicial energy might falter and judges might abandon a
problem, but bureaucracies are also inconstant in their pursuit of
goals other than self-preservation."
Horowitz also emphasizes that courts are not self-starters. He
argues that, because courts are basically dependent on litigants,
judges are deprived of control and coordination of policymaking.
Most legislative action, however, results only from a series of constituent or interest-group complaints. Indeed, a single individual
may be able to get a case through the judicial system more easily
than he can get a bill through the legislature. Moreover, what of the
frequent criticism of executive agencies and regulatory commissions
for their lack of responsiveness to those bringing complaints? The
author's concession that "no decisionmaker really sets his own
agenda"'" comes much too late to be helpful. In asserting that courts
cannot be self-stoppers- "t is difficult to prevent a judicial deci93. Id. at 264.
94. Other deficiencies in comparison are numerous:
(a) "The judicial process is less subject to exogenuous political influences than are
the other branches" and "there are fewer participants in the adjudicative process than
in the legislative process." Id. at 22, 23. As to the latter, perhaps, but "exogenuous" is
not defined and substantial amicus curiae participation in important cases is not discussed.
(b) The judicial process is "among the most public of decision processes." Id. at
64. "Sunshine" laws for legislatures and executive agencies make such a statement
patently inaccurate. The final results of judicial deliberations fill many volumes, but
even in the federal courts most trial court decisions are unreported and an increasing
number of federal court rulings are "Not for Publication" although available to the
parties. Most crucial is the fact that, while formal procedures are known, outsiders are
not present during deliberations.
95. rd. at 294.
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sion"11-Horowitz also fails to recognize that, particularlyin social
policy cases, rules of standing and justiciability are regularly used
to avoid decisions; this is quite evident in the Burger Court's rulings
on access to the courts.
Had Horowitz desired to be systematic in his treatment of the
relative capacities of governmental institutions to solve social problems, he need only have turned to the extremely compact and balanced argument of J. Woodford Howard, Jr., in his 1969 article for
the Journal of Public Law entitled "Adjudication Considered as a
Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variation on the Separation of
Powers," which Horowitz characterizes in a footnote as a "partial
inventory," but with one minor exception otherwise ignores. Noting
similarities as well as differences in the institutions, Howard points
out, for example, that both legislators and judges are generalists
and, as such, "share common problems of being adequately informed about disputes and in their relations with experts."9 Legislators, in fact, Howard concludes, are likely to make less effective
use of information sources because "debate is less focused and the
witnesses and data are often stacked as a means of providing a
public record for decisions reached elsewhere and on different evidence." 8
Playing down the self-generating aspect of legislative action,
Howard asserts that "legislatures function most effectively under
conditions of outside policy guidance. . . suggest[ing] that differences in initiatives are at best differences in degree."99 Moreover,
Howard observes, "the scope of issues is apt to be broader in legislatures than in courts," with more claimants, interests, and viewpoints exerting pressure in the legislative process than in adjudication.es According to Howard, "what differentiates decision-makers
are the stimuli they receive and how they may respond within the
framework of their office."10 1 Neither adjudication nor legislation is
more restrained than the other. Rather, "they operate under different sets of constraints."10 2 The central distinguishing characteristic
96. Id. at 22.
97. Howard, supra note 65, at 350.
98. Id. at 350-51.
99. Id. at 343. However, "dependence on claimants for defining issues and structuring
options is apt to be larger in adjudication than in legislation," id. at 346; planning and
uniformity of policy cannot be easily achieved, with "the choice of cases. . . in the hands of
dispersed actors." Id. at 367. Moreover, private initiative, "the indispensable starter in judicial enforcement of personal rights," can be restricted either by intimidation or the financial
limitations of those wishing to bring cases." Id.
100. Id. at 346.
101. Id. at 343.
102. Id. at 360.
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of adjudication, he concludes, "is that every choice by every actor
except jurors must be publicly accounted for or rationalized every
step of the way. No other process of social decision imposes such
requirements. In effect, adjudication is controlled by a different
system of accountability."' 103 Overall, Howard finds adjudication to
be an effective technique for policymaking in:
a relatively narrow range of social conflicts. . .. [1It works most effectively

in concert with other agencies, preferably under circumstances of unified pol-

icy goals so that institutional conflict is minimal. Alone, when other actors are
stalemated or acquiescent, it may successfully umpire clashing jurisdictional
claims and thus unfold the latent meaning of constitutional principles."'
IV.

COURTS AND THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS

Horowitz's case studies lead him to stress "the impotence of the
courts to supervise the implementation of their decrees" and "their
limited ability to monitor the consequences of their action." ' 5 The
court's decision in Hobson It, Horowitz argues, indicates the need
for periodic readjustment of judicial decrees. Although he recognizes
the difficulty of assessing the influences of Hobson It beyond its
"fairly clear and direct consequences," Horowitz points out that the
ruling affected a wide range of activities. Some effects were "ephemeral," but significant long-range effects, such as better information
systems and changed budgetary procedures, also occurred. One
important lesson of Hobson, says Horowitz, is that judicial decrees
require periodic readjustment, something which did not occur in
this instance because the parties were reluctant to return to court
one more time.
When he turns his attention to Gault, Horowitz finds that,
while ostensibly procedural, the ruling had broader substantive effects, largely because there was "no way to limit the impact to one
discrete segment of the interconnected parts of the juvenile justice
system."'0 8 Trends toward legislative creation of separate categories
of juvenile offenders, particularly PINS (persons in need of supervision), and toward diversion from formal proceedings accelerated,
and delinquency simultaneously became more criminalized at least
for serious offenses. These broad effects of Gault, however, were
limited by the Court's misunderstanding of the role of lawyers in
juvenile proceedings. The Court assumed-mistakenly, Horowitz
contends-that the decision would result in more formalized juve103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 349.
Id. at 369.
Hosowrrz, supra note 22, at 264.
Id. at 218.
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nile court procedures and presumably more contested dispositions
as lawyers became involved on a routine basis. Lawyers, it turns out,
appear much less often than the Court anticipated.101 In addition,
juvenile defense attorneys, who often share the values of the court,
engage in plea-bargaining on behalf of their clients, and urge their
clients to "tell the truth" rather than to avail themselves of their
fifth amendment right to remain silent. Not only did these aspects
of the lawyers' posture not help juvenile defendants but in some
situations represented juveniles actually received more severe sentences. Unfortunately, Horowitz's discussion of Gault's effect is
flawed by his failure to take into account that aspect of the ruling
which said that the decision required counsel only where institutionalization might result. Nor does Horowitz discuss juvenile court
officers' habit of letting the disposition dictate the procedure they
use or judges' practice of avoiding Gault-specified procedures by
deciding first that no institutionalization will be required.0 8
Horowitz also fails to take into account two other critical
"environmental" factors, changes in the age of majority and judicial
assignment procedures. Different juvenile court "styles" are mentioned but not whether a judge is a permanent full-time juvenile
court judge rather than a regular trial judge wearing a juvenile judge
hat part-time; the former, particularly if in their positions for a long
time, would be more sympathetic to the aims of the juvenile court
movement than the latter. ' If retaining a juvenile in custody until
his or her majority means retention only until age eighteen instead
of age twenty-one, prosecutors may prefer to proceed against a
seventeen-year-old as an adult, thus further reinforcing the trend,
which Gault accelerated, toward criminalizing serious offenses committed by juveniles.
In another case study, careful examination of the post-Mapp
studies, particularly the work of Bradley Canon,"1 ' and identifica107. Id. at 187.
108. See Lefstein, Stapleton, & Teitlebaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and
Its Implementation, 3 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 491, 496 & n.7.
109. See Canon & Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, A CaseStudy, 10
J. Fam. L. 300 (1971) (not cited by Horowitz).
110. He cites "Taking Advantage of a Quasi-Experiment Situation: The Impact of
Mapp v. Ohio" (paper presented by B. Canon at the American Political Science Association
meetings, 1974), and (later), Canon, OrganizationalContumacy and the Transmission of
JudicialPolicies:The Mapp, Escobedo, Miranda, and Gault Cases, 20VM,.. L. Rav. 50 (1974).
The former can be found, revised, as Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at
the State and FederalLevels, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977). However, Canon's more extensive Is
the Exclusionary Rule in FailingHealth? Some New Data anda Plea Against a Preciptious
Conclusion,62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1973-1974), is not cited, nor does Horowitz make use of Canon's
study of the frequency with which state supreme courts answered important search questions
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tion of factors affecting its impact, such as the extent of police
knowledge about search law, the offense charged, the kind of police
unit involved, and the way cases are handled in court, led Horowitz
to conclude that the exclusionary rule has been at least somewhat
effective. Its deterrent effect has not been uniform, however, and
new police behavior developed, including perjured testimony, harassment of offenders, and illegal arrests to punish criminals where
the rules prevented convictions.
Somewhat like the Gault Court, the Mapp Court assumed the
existence of an operating system of formal proceedings in which
defense lawyers would raise motions to suppress illegally obtained
evidence. The justices, Horowitz contends, did not appreciate that
many lawyers do not press illegal search questions and that trial
judges often are hostile to having such questions raised."' Although
Mapp (like Gault) was decided several years before the Court legitimized plea-bargaining,112 the failure of the Court to recognize the
pervasiveness of plea-bargaining was even more evident. Horowitz
suggests that Mapp's effect will be greatest in situations in which
the prosecutor screens cases for inadequate or improperly seized
evidence and will be far less at the post-indictment stage. Thus
Mapp's effects may be further reduced by the Court's ruling in
1 13 in which the Court held that the fourth
United States v. Calandra,
amendment does not require exclusion of improperly seized evidence from grand jury proceedings. Calandra,says Horowitz, makes
it easier to secure indictments, thus, in combination with Mapp's
effects, further encouraging pretrial disposition by plea-bargaining.
Horowitz attributes many of the unanticipated consequences of
the decisions he examines to the courts' focus on rights. This produces a tendency to "highlight the proposed innovation and...
[to] blur into the background the character of the receptacle for
that innovation." 4 Moreover, the courts are confined to the reallocation of existing resources and cannot direct the expansion of budgets or the raising of new resources, which are legislative functions.1 1 5
posed by the applicability of federal search law to the states, certainly a factor in police
compliance with fourth amendment rules. Canon, Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a
U.S. Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 109 (1973).
111. HoRowrrz, supra note 22, at 254.
112. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
113. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
114. Honowrrz, supra note 22, at 262.
115. Id. at 257-58. Court rulings, of course, can produce pressure for the expansion of
governmental expenditures and bureaucrats seeking larger budgets try to manipulate courts

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:727

Because courts assume "that they are working with more or less
uniform situations for which a single rule will suffice,"" 6 Horowitz
believes they "find it difficult to devise a coherent program of action. ' "

7

At the mercy of subsequent events and mainly dependent

on subsequent litigation to correct the inadequacies in their initial
rulings, courts thus are unable to minimize the unintended consequences of their rulings.
As with other questions, Horowitz seems unsure where to place
responsibility for providing judges with feedback in order to assist
them with implementation of their rulings. Because of the government's problems with external monitors, he prefers to give primary
responsibility to litigants, their attorneys, and the judges themselves. However, he seems unhappy about the methods that lawyers
and judges have developed, finding "a mark of the increasing overlap between courts and administrators" in the requirements of
"periodic compliance reports" which some decrees contain.118 Horowitz also argues that monitoring of the effects of a case belongs
in the bureaucracy when such monitoring "edges over into constant
supervision, or if the latter is what is really required."1 Despite
these problems, Horowitz looks with favor on having cases return to
court because decrees can then be recalibrated. If judges and lawyers have enough energy, he says, "no redefinition of the 'right' and
recalibration of the 'remedy' is necessarily the last."'20 Thus he finds
the recurring nature of Area-Wide Council and Hobson encouraging.
One way in which courts may ascertain appropriate information
about implementation is for the judges to ask lawyers to propose
additional alternative remedies. Here, Horowitz makes the ingenious suggestion that the winning party, instead of formulating only
a single-option decree, should put forth -every available alternative,
specifying the consequences of each.121 Still another option is for
courts to retain jurisdiction over a case, thus removing the plaintiff's
to obtain such decrees. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), a ruling on
expenditures for the District of Columbia's special problem children, is used by Horowitz as
an example in which such attempted manipulation did not succeed, leaving only redistribution.
116. Honowrrz, supra note 22, at 261.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 55.
119. Id. at 293. An additional complication, federal court supervision of state officials,
is not considered. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1973) (judges' allegedly discriminatory practices); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (Ohio National Guard riot control
rules).
120. Honown, supranote 22, at 167.
121. Id. at 288.
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burden of having to return to court with renewed litigation. Masters
can also be appointed to oversee the implementation of a decision
and to make recommendations to the judge.
Horowitz underestimates judges' information about the effects
of their decisions."' 2 Our expectations of what judges should do make
it difficult for them to speak openly about the subject or, when they
do, to disclaim that it affects their rulings on the merits, as Justice
Powell did in his opinion for the Court in San Antonio Independent
School Dist. v. Rodriguez'23 in adverting to the financial turmoil
that would have resulted from invalidation of the property tax for
school financing purposes."' Other Supreme Court opinions reveal
the justices' awareness of potential effects. For example, in refusing
to apply certain rules of criminal procedure retroactively, the Court
regularly has spoken of the effect of retroactive application on the
administration of justice. That the Court's refusal to give retroactive effect to most of those rules may well have been based upon
strategic considerations,s2 indicates not only that the justices are
aware of the potential effects of their rulings, but that they act on
that knowledge. Moreover, the justices' explicit use of the effect on
criminal justice as a criterion in these cases also indicates that what
Horowitz calls "costing" may enter litigation not merely "through
the back door,"1 21but directly as well.
Where does Horowitz's discussion of implementation and impact fit into the literature? He provides effective criticism of impact
studies when he asserts that:
(1)

. . .the significance of court decisions is not primarily measured in terms

of compliance, (2) [but] it lies heavily in the consequences of compliance
(often in second-order consequences), (3) in consequences registered in other
forums besides the intended forums, and (4) sometimes in consequences produced as much by the interaction of several court decisions as by any one of
them.' N
122. Horowitz says that "of course" the Court's change in position on the compulsory
flag salute case, from Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), to West

Virginia Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), had nothing to do with the first ruling's
effects, HoRowrrz, supranote 22, at 55, but this ignores the strong likelihood that the justices
were aware that Jehovah's Witnesses had been persecuted and their buildings burned. See
THiaD BRANcH OF GovaNmENT: 8 CASES INCONSTITrMONAL PoLmcs 27-28 (H. Pritchett & A. Westin eds. 1963).
123. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
124. Id. at 56 n.111.
125. Fahlund, Retroactivity and the Warren Court: The Strategy of a Revolution, 35
J. POL. 570 (1973).

Manwaring, The FlagSalute Case, in T-

126. Hoaowrrz, supra note 22, at 34. Considerations of cost, of course, regularly figure
in the disposition of torts claims. See, e.g., Douglas, VicariousLiability and Administration
of Risk and Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, in PFRSPECTV ON TORT LAw 109, 142 (R.
Rabin ed. 1976).
127. Honowrrz, supra note 22, at 287. On the last point, I have suggested elsewhere that
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He has problems, however, with certain basic concepts. Evasion of rulings is one useful concept from the literature of which he
does not avail himself.128 More important, he refers to the
"implications" of cases, particularly in his discussion of Area- Wide
Council and, to a lesser extent, Gault. Lawyers have long discussed
the implications of rulings, but such speculations are not the same
as specifying what happens when a case is handed down in terms
of how it is implemented or in terms of its actual impact.
Horowitz also misses other important aspects of the literature.
For example, his statement that "the lawsuit and the court decree
are often thought to be more powerful moral influences than are
alternative avenues of problem solving"'' 9 is at odds with the proposition that the executive and particularly the legislative branches
are more legitimate sources of law for bringing about social change
than are the courts.3 0 In addition, the author totally ignores the
burgeoning policy analysis literature, which could have assisted not
only in his consideration of implementation, revealing difficulties
that legislatures and administrative agencies have experienced, 1 ,
but also with the broader questions of institutional
capacity and the
312
reliance of courts upon social research.'
Despite Horowitz's measured evaluation of Mapp, his general
view of what we should expect the courts to accomplish seems unleavened by the realization that less than full compliance and even
some resistance must be expected. As Baum has recently pointed
out, we tend to gauge the response to Supreme Court decisions by
an impossibly high standard in which a mixed reaction to the ruling
is seen as failure.'33 Instead, we should be aware that "no policymaker can expect complete acceptance of its policies by other institutions that are subject to competing influences, and even partial
the effect of a line of cases would be greater than the effect of a single case. WASBY, supra
note 21, at 247.
128. Id. at 30-32.
129. HoRowrrz, supra note 22, at 22.
130. Evan, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in APPuED SocioLoGy 285-91 (A.
Gouldner & S.Miller eds. 1965).
131. M. DERTHCK, Naw TowNs iN TowN: WHY A FEDERAL PRoGwm FAILED (1972); J.
PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMNTATION (1973). See also Van Horn & Van Meter, The
Implementation of IntergovernmentalPolicy, in PUBLIC POLICY MAKYNG INA FEDERAL SYSTEM
39 (C. Jones & R. Thomas eds. 1976).
132. See Cook & Scioli, Impact Analysis in Public Policy Research, in PuBLic POLICY
EVALUATION 95 (K. Dolbeare ed. 1975); Caplan, Social Research and NationalPolicy: What
Gets Used, by Whom, for What Purposes, and With What Effect?, 28 IN"L Soc. Sci. J. 187
(1976); Jones, Why Congress Can't Do PolicyAnalysis, 2 PoLICY ANALYSIS 251 (1976). For a
good introduction, see POLICY STUDIES REVmw ANNUAL, (S. Nagel ed. 1977).
133. Baum, Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Policies:Reconsidering a Negative Picture,4 JusT.Sys. J. (forthcoming, 1978).
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acceptance is often difficult to achieve."' 3 The Court cannot provide definitive rulings in all policy areas or review more than a
relatively few lower court decisions, thus allowing lower courts much
latitude in generating policy. Indeed, the relationship between the
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts is not unlike the relationship between any superior and subordinates who, at least some
of the time, through delay and avoidance can constrain considerably
what the superior attempts to accomplish. 3
Part of Horowitz's difficulty here may stem from a faulty view
of the role of adjudication in the overall pattern of societal dispute
settlement. He complains that "the lawsuit can increasingly be
thought of [as] an option more or less interchangeable with options
in other forums"'' 3 and claims that adjudication is inappropriate
"for those problems best resolved by a process of negotiation.' ' 37 At

1 3
least since the NAACP began its attack on racial discrimination, 1
it should hardly be surprising that disgruntled parties seek favorable policy where they can find it. Even earlier, courts served as
alternative dispute-settlement and policymaking forums when the
advantaged (the Liberty Lobby rather than the NAACP) turned to
them for help to avoid what they saw as the ravages of state and
federal economic regulation.
Courts not only are a place of retreat after defeat elsewhere, but
litigation is often another step in an ongoing process. 39 Horowitz,
however, recognizes neither that cases come to court after negotiation has broken down nor that negotiation does not cease when a
case is filed. Cases often are settled once they are well along in the
judicial process."' Perhaps Howard has put it best: "Adjudication
usually comes somewhere in the middle of conflict resoluton se-

134. Id.
135. Baum, Implementation of JudicialDecisions:An OrganizationalAnalysis, 4 AM.
POL. Q.86 (1976); Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL. ScI.
REv. 1017 (1959).
136. Hoaowrrz, supra note 22, at 10.
137. Id.at 22-23.
138. See R.KLU E , SMPLE JUsTc: THE HisToRy OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(1976); C. VOSE, CAUCAsiANS ONLY: THE SUPRam- COURT, rHE NAACP, AND T REsTmcTivE
COVENANT CASES (1959).
139. As two commentators have observed, "Adjudication often is only a phase or tactic

in ongoing processes of conflict resolution." Sarat & Grossman, Courts and Conflict Resolution: Problems in the MobilizationofAdjudication, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1200, 1213 (1975).
140. See Benjamin & Morris, The Appellate Settlement Conference: A Procedure
Whose Time Has Come, 62 A.B.A.J. 1433 (1976); "The Appellate Settlement Conference: An
Effective Procedural Reform" (paper presented by J. Goldman to the American Political
Science Association, 1977). Indeed, my observation of oral argument of a number of National
Labor Relations Board cases in the Eighth Circuit revealed that appellate judges at times
from the bench encourage settlements.
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quences. Thus it serves less to avoid conflict than to channel and
resolve disputes already begun. 141 As the literature on implementation and impact indicates, adjudication does not end matters. Instead of saying that "the law is what the judges say it is," we need
to realize that it is more arcurate to say that "the law is what the
judges say it is, after all others have had their say." '
V.

JuDriCiL RELIANCE UPON SoCIAL SCIENCE DATA

Courts long have been faced with facts drawn from social research. A change in the use to which social science data have been
put, however, has created a problem. In the Brandeis brief, developed to show the existence of social facts on which the legislature
could have based its decision to pass a statute, the validity of facts
was not an issue. Yet the validity of social facts did come very much
into issue when litigants turned from trying to sustain legislation to
attacking it.1 3 The problems involved in judicial attempts to use
social facts and particularly social science research have been noted
in the literature,'44 and Horowitz handles the issue quite well.
Horowitz shows the relation between the impact of judicial decisions and courts' use of social facts: "[S]ources of judicial information can affect not only the soundness of a decision, but also its
' As he notes, the Supreme
legitimacy and ultimately its impact."145
Court's reliance on police interrogation manuals in Miranda v.
Arizona1" led police to think that the Court had inaccurate information about police practices, which affected not only the soundness
but also the impact of the decision. 7 The Court's famous footnote
141. Howard, supra note 65, at 339.
142. WASBY, supra note 21, at 21.
143. See P. RosEN, Tim SuPmME COURT AND SOCL SCMcE (1972), reviewed byWasby,
18 VILL. L. Rv. 519 (1973).

144. "As the legal questions of school desegregation have become more and more complex. . ., social science research has become less certain and more debatable-or at least it
seems so to many lawyers and judges." Levin & Moise, School DesegregationLitigationin
the Seventies and the Use of Social Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 LAw &
CoNTump. PROB. 50, 55 (1975). "The process of informing the judicial mind in prominent
constitutional cases is far more complicated than is suggested by the traditional conception
of the adversary system." Lamb, Judicial Policy-Making and Information Flow to the Supreme Court, 29 VAND. L. Ray. 46, 61 (1976). See also the comments by Judge William Doyle
(10th Circuit), supra note 8, at 10-11.
145. Honowrrz, supra note 22, at 278. Cf. Miller & Barron, The Supreme Court, The
Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices:A PreliminaryInquiry, 61
VA. L. Rav. 1187, 1222 (1975) ("Compliance with law can be frustrated when access to the
information upon which a decision is based is needlessly restricted.").
146. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
147. HoRovnTz, supra note 22, at 277-78.
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eleven in Brown v. Board of Education provides another example
in which the use of social facts hindered the legitimacy of the
Court's decision.' The Court's use of social facts also can facilitate
acceptance, as in Terry v. Ohio,"I in which the Court used information on the danger to officers on the street presented in an amicus
brief by Americans for Effective Law Enforcement.
Looking at judicial treatment of social facts in the Area-Wide
Council case, the author stresses the court's lack of knowledge of the
recurrent nature of disputes between citizen groups and Model Cities administrators and of the heterogeneity of situations to be affected by a single judicial order. Hobson demonstrates that when
the 'data are inconclusive, the party with the burden of proof invariably loses. The case also reveals the interplay of empirical economic
questions with legal questions: legal questions determine what empirical facts are relevant, and the empirical facts presented affect
the legal rulings. Horowitz argues that social science, even if it did
not produce the result in Hobson, certainly hardened the court's
determination to come to the conclusion it reached, in part because
important qualifications about the relation between expenditures
and educational quality were lost in the translation of the data into
the summaries that were submitted to the court as evidence. 5 '
In Gault, social science findings also were important, reinforcing the Court's commitment to the use of formal procedure in juvenile proceedings. Skeptical about the juvenile courts, the Court was
not similarly skeptical about social science. The tentative nature of
social science findings about the negative relation between informal
juvenile court proceedings and juveniles' rehabilitation was suppressed because the justices relied on secondary materials that were
not tentative. Disconfirming evidence about the relationship came
only after the ruling.
Horowitz says that courts generally have only a modest competence to find social facts. On the whole, they pay too little attention
to social facts and process information about them unsatisfactorily.
Courts do not even do well with facts about other courts, as the
Gault and Mapp case studies demonstrate. Judicial factfinding is
particularly ill-adapted to ascertaining social facts, which are different from the legal facts needed for deciding particular cases. Just
as there is an inescapable tension between the unique facts of a
148.
149.
150.
151.

347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
See WAshy, D'AMATo, & Mm xn, supra note 32, at 103-05.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Hoaowrrz, supranote 22, at 279.
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given case and the recurrent facts of a pattern of cases, so are there
"fundamental differences between legal inquiry and social science
inquiry.'

52

The adversary process, Horowitz argues, obfuscates be-

havioral issues. Judges' dependence on summaries of social scientists' research, problems with expert testimony, and rules of evidence all create difficulties, as does the fact that appellate courts
generally are foreclosed by the "clearly erroneous" evidentiary rule
from addressing social facts on appeal. Moreover
on the one hand, the piecemeal character of adjudication tends to distort social
facts in the direction of isolating related phenomena; on the other hand, the
emphasis on the individual litigants' case and the reliance on formal rather

than behavioral materials both distort social facts in the direction of a usually
fictitious uniformity. 1i

Horowitz says judges, distant from the facts with which they
have to deal, are "likely to be doubly uninformed, on particulars
and on context."'' 5x Just as he underestimated judges' awareness of
the potential effects of their decisions, he underestimates their
knowledge of the social facts that are an ingredient of those decisions, although he concedes that judges are "very much immersed
in the general culture."'' 5 It is, however, clear that, like most lawyers, judges generally are ignorant of social science methods and
techniques.'56
Changes in the ways in which courts obtain and process social
science data are necessary. Courts should not be limited to considering only those facts that the litigants before them choose to reveal.
Miller and Barron have suggested that judges, instead of taking
judicial notice of facts which are in controversy, could "remand the
issue of the taking of judicial notice of a particular issue of legislative fact to the trial court."' 15 Rules for judicial notice of legislative
facts could also be adopted. Courts also could ask for further briefs
on legislative facts or could ask the Solicitor General to brief the
broad aspects of a controversy. 5 These suggestions fit in with the
152. Id. at 274.
153. Id. at 262.
154. Id. at 31.
155. Id. at 56.
156. Only a few of the nation's law schools have had (or have) the capability to train
law students in social science (resisted by most law students when it is available), and
programs developed to teach lawyers about social science, in particular the National Science
Foundation's SSMILE (Social Science Methods in Legal Education) program, have not been
able to reach very many.
157. Miller & Barron, supra note 145, at 1233-34.
158. They also raise the question of a panel of resident social scientists but feel the
incompatibility between social science data and the adversary method would make this ineffective.
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idea, consonant with the bias against advisory opinions we find in
adversary process, that the facts are to be as fully developed as
possible before a case comes to court. Like the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exhaustion of remedies, they are devices to have the
facts developed by those with the appropriate expertise. These remedies are also very much in tune with feeling that in a democracy
the appropriate place for fact-finding is not the courts, another explanation of judges' reluctance to deal with social facts regardless
of competence, but one which Horowitz does not discuss. Because
he assumes additional problems would result from adoption of
changes in the methods that courts use to obtain data beyond that
put before them, Horowitz shies away from providing the courts
with the increased ability to inform themselves, although he does
suggest some modest changes in both the rules of evidence and
appellate review. Yet he does not take the position that the courts
should avoid data. Instead, he argues that if courts placed more
reliance on social data, judges would see how unclear answers are
and thus would be more cautious about prescribing solutions to
complex social problems by means of broad, uniform legal rules.
This position, however, seems to leave Horowitz wanting to have it
both ways, the result of which would be to leave the courts in their
present muddle.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE COURTS AND THE CONSIDERATION OF JUDICIAL

CAPACITY

Even if one takes serious exception to many of Horowitz's arguments, one need not disagree with the proposition that judges
should consider judicial capacity before accepting a case or in rendering decisions and formulating their decrees. Horowitz himself
provides a reasonable summary of some questions judges might ask:
whether the situation they propose to control is too fluid to grasp by means
short of day-to-day management; whether the case is representative of some
universe of cases onto which a rule can be fastened; whether the social milieu
is too diverse for a single rule; whether there are sufficient incentives to induce
those formally subject to the court's orders to adopt the court's goals and

implement them in other than perverse ways; whether the interaction of several targets will combine "chemically" to transform the decree on the ground;
and whether the court can find out what is happening to its decree after the

decree has been rendered. 5'

Rather than developing a new set of questions for determining
capacity, the best way to conclude this examination of the Horowitz
159.

HORowrZ, supra note 22, at 273.
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volume is to present a brief summary of a cogent preliminary study
of judicial capacity recently developed by Lief Carter, which provides a model for analysis of the judicial capacity issue. The types
of questions usually asked about judicial policymaking, Carter asserts, include first, whether judicial review is democratic; second,
whether a court decided wisely in a particular case; and third,
whether its legal reasoning was of high quality.' ° Elements of the
wisdom of a court's particular decision, such as whether a court in
a given instance adopts empirically sound assumptions and whether
a court's solution produces the intended consequences, are among
the types of questions Horowitz asks in his case studies. A fourth
type of question concerns "the capacity of courts to respond to problems effectively," says Carter, adding that "we may assess effectiveness both in isolation and in comparison with the institutional characteristics of other policy-making bodies."'8 1
For an institution to qualify as appropriate to deal with a given
problem, Carter maintains that its policy must "accord with fundamental, widely shared beliefs about acceptable governmental action;" its policy must "carry some plausible hope of alleviating the
problem;" and its promulgation and implementation of the policy
must not "destroy the position and authority of the policy's
source. 16 2 Carter identifies four pairs of criteria that an institution
must satisfy. In each pair, the second element "examines whether,
regardless of the skills of members of a given policy-making institution (PMI), any other PMI is equally or better prepared to proceed,
and whether alternative policy sources, even if they may be better
equipped technically to proceed, will in fact do so." 63' Thus Carter
injects into the discussion both comparative capacity and the will
to proceed, the first of which Horowitz considers only haphazardly
and the latter virtually not at all.
Carter's four technical criteria are: (1) familiarity with the language in which a policy problem is articulated and an
understandingabout "cause-and-effect beliefs that define the existence of a problem in the first place;" 4 (2) reliable access to
information bearing on the causes of the problem, on all solutions
proposed and on their direct and indirect consequences, on targets,
and on strategies for implementation; (3) the ability to reformulate
LAw

160. Carter, When Courts Should Make Policy: An InstitutionalApproach, in PUBLIC
AND PUBLIC POLICY 141, 142-43 (J. Gardiner ed. 1977).
161. Id. at 144.
162. Id. at 145.
163. Id. at 146.
164. Id. at 145.
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policy when new information is obtained; and (4) once there is
agreement that a problem exists and on perceptions of the problem,
the public's belief that the institution's authority and competence
match the problem, so that affected target populations will not
ignore policy initiatives regardless of their content.
These criteria of technical competence, effective information
processing, and political acceptability, Carter says, "will support
different conclusions at different times as policy moves generate
new information and as political conditions and public values
change."' 1 Courts were the appropriate institutions to act on desegregation in 1954, when no one else would act and when there was
no bureaucratic machinery to enforce policies, but subsequent policy changes and changes in the composition of the electorate now
complicate that picture.
Applying his criteria, Carter finds judicial intervention clearly
inappropriate for the solution of substantive due process issues and
for determination of policy issues like the bombing of Cambodia, in
the latter because the courts had no control over implementation
and no routinized access to information about international negotiations. On the other hand, judicial action on reapportionment and
criminal procedure issues was appropriate. On the question of reapportionment, Carter contends, the legislature would not act, there
were no clear costs for the courts to intervene, the courts could
operate from a philosophically powerful set of assumptions, and the
availability of census data allowed frequent restructuring of districts through litigation.1 8 On criminal procedure issues, the goal of
avoiding excessive police power was widely shared, the legislatures
and police were not likely to act, and because the questions arose
out of the legal system itself, the judges would be familiar with the
18 7
language and with the problems of confessions and lack of counsel.
(One must remember, however, Horowitz's well-developed point
that the justices did not do well with either Gault or Mapp despite
such presumed familiarity.)
Carter finds judicial intervention to be less appropriate in three
other policy areas-abortion, the death penalty, and racially preferential policies. On abortion, the affected minority could not force a
policy change, but the legal and political traditions on which the
Court drew were not as clear as those, for example, on the issue of
school prayer, in which "the bulk of the indicators justify judicial
165. Id. at 148.
166. Id. at 149-50.
167. Id. at 150.
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' Moreover, new empirical scientific findings could
intervention."168

necessitate invalidating a decision on abortion. In dealing with the
issue of the death penalty, Carter contends, there is no clear constitutional norm on which the judges could draw. Empirical questions
about its effect are as yet unresolved, the issue can be bargained
politically, and intense and broad retributive feelings pose risks for
the courts.'69
Carter's analysis leads him to suggest that judges in some instances can provide rough but plausible answers to at least these
questions:
Does the case raise problems that men with legal training and experience

have any special competence to analyze?
Is this case likely to receive wide or narrow press coverage? Will it likely
become a general campaign issue? Will virtually any available policy choice
offend widespread political values and interests?
Are other [policy-making institutions] currently actively attempting to
deal with this policy issue, or is the policy issue presented to the court tangential or unrelated to issues on current electoral and/or bureaucratic agendas?
To what extent will the public perceive the issue as necessarily embodying
values ingrained in both popular political philosophy and constitutional doctrine ... such that the courts may claim moral competence to make policy?
To what extent, conversely, does the court run the risk of being perceived
factually wrong?7

Such questions, coupled with the items Horowitz notes, provide
a good starting point for judges who choose to look at judicial capacity. Effective use of such questions as another element in the mix
of concerns judges must face means admitting not only that courts
are policymakers but also that they engage in strategy, a thought
that many resist because they prefer not to think of courts as political institutions."' Yet, if courts are to be effective, they must engage
in strategy. Courts should be beacons of principled deliberation, but
at the same time, they should not emit sterile pronouncements to
which no one pays heed. To be most effective, courts probably
should limit the explicitness with which they approach the issues
raised here. Their resulting inexplicit methods of approaching these
issues will provide the subject matter for much future study. One
hopes that such studies will be modeled more on the work of Howard
and Carter than on The Courts and SocialPolicy, which through its
168. Id. at 151.
169. Id. at 153.
170. Id. at 155.

171. The few existing analyses of strategy include: W. MuRHY, ELEzpNTS or JUDICAL
STRATEGY (1964); Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights, and Civil Dissonance,77YALE
L.J. 1520 (1968); and WASBY, D'AmATO, & M ErRxLF, supra note 32.
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failure to be systematic or to approach the subject of judicial capacity in a more straightforward, evenhanded manner, does not assist
us in understanding the judicial process as it could have.

THE CONSTITUTION AND) THE COMMON LAW: THE DECLINE OF THE DocTRINES OF SEPARATION OF PowERs AND FEDERALISM. By Randall Brid-

well and Ralph U. Whitten. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
1977. Pp. xv, 206. $18.00.
Reviewed by HerbertA. Johnson*
This short and tightly written volume will have a major impact
upon the legal history of the federal constitution and on the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts. Professors Bridwell and Whitten
have undertaken a re-evaluation of the role that common law played
in nineteenth-century federal jurisprudence. They question the accepted belief that the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins'
has greater historical foundation than the repudiated rule of Swift
v. Tyson,2 which permitted the development of federal common law
in diversity of citizenship cases. Basic to their argument is the postulate that modern theories ofjurisprudence have been read into our
historical analysis of the nineteenth-century legal system. The fundamental mistake made by historians is the constant insistence that
the language of the cases of the period and the writings about its
jurisprudence actually mean what one thinks they should mean by
modern standards, rather than what they seem to mean as practiced
by people of the period. 3 The results have been misleading, according to the authors, and historians will recognize an indictment of
anachronism emerging from their discussion.
While the sources relied upon by the authors of this book are
orthodox enough-case reports, statutes, jurisprudential writings,
and personal papers-the authors grapple with these materials in
new and challenging ways. Fundamental to their study is the historiographical problem of the way in which the early national lawyers
Professor of History and Law, University of South Carolina. A.B., Columbia University, 1955; L.L.B., New York Law School, 1960; M.A., Columbia University, 1961; Ph.D.,
Columbia University, 1965.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
*

3. R. BIUDWELL & R. WwrN, TnE CoNsTMrrbON AND T COMMON LAw: THE DECLINE
oF TuE DOCRINES OF SEPARATON OF POWERS AND FEDERASM xiii-xiv (1977).
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and judges approached decisionmaking. This question in a number
of respects touches upon the traditional debate whether AngloAmerican judges find the law or whether they by their decisions
actually make new law. Bridwell and Whitten argue convincingly
that the evidence proves that before 1860 judges viewed their function as that of rendering decisions that would effectuate the normal
expectations of the parties, which in turn were based upon the customary usages of the communities in which the controverted transations took place, including the trade customs which applied to the
case. 4 They observe that, by way of contrast, after 1860 judges began
to take a realistic position toward the law and their functions and
began to consider rules of law as the commands of a central sovereign authority, based upon and implementing public policy within
its political jurisdiction. 5 No longer did law find its origin in customs
and usages; rather it was produced either by legislative enactments
or by judicial decisions that established rules of conduct and ordered individual expectations along policy lines selected by the legislators and judges.
The authors' evaluation of the role of custom in judicial decisionmaking and their sense of the law-finding function of judges are
entitled to very serious consideration. Local custom had a pervasive
influence upon the development of law in colonial America and,
although that reliance declined somewhat during the eighteenth
century, custom and usage were still major elements in the growth
and reception of law in the decade preceding the American Revolution.6 The extent to which the colonial legal system survived the
American Revolution remains unknown. Despite William Nelson's
carefully researched study of Massachusetts in the period, it remains unclear whether the American Revolution had a substantially
disruptive effect in the area of private law or jurisprudence.7 Certainly Nelson has demonstrated that the community-centered jurisprudence of the colonial period had given way to a more individualistic and laissez-faire economic philosophy by 1830. Yet this in itself
is not indicative of an alteration in the methodology of judicial
4. Id. at xv, 4-5, 11-14.
5. Id. at 116-19, 137.
6. Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31
COLUM. L. REv. 416 (1931); Haskins, The Beginnings of PartibleInheritancein the American
Colonies, 51 YALE L.J. 1280 (1942); as to the eighteenth century see Johnson, English Statutes
in Colonial New York, 58 N.Y. HiST. 277 (1977).
7. W. NELSON, AMERICmANZATION OF TEm CommoN LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHAGE- ON
MASSACHUSErrS SocIgry, 1760-1830 (1975); see also Flaherty, Book Review, 26 U. TonoNo

L.J. 108 (1976); Johnson, Book Review, 76 COLUM. L. Rev. 713 (1976); Morris, Book Review,
21 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 86 (1977).
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decisionmaking. Indeed the conclusion that the American Revolution worked a dramatic change in the concept of law and in judges'
assessment of their functions must await close study of the available
judicial writing in the various state courts.
More recently, Morton J. Horwitz has argued that an instrumental approach to judge-made law became increasingly common
after 1780, fostered by an altered view of the position of courts in
the legal system and by an emerging desire to develop a public
policy designed to encourage business enterprise.8 Bridwell and
Whitten comment that "if Horwitz is correct about the American
common law system between 1780 and 1860 we are surely wrong" 9
and then proceed to discuss their disagreements with Horwitz. Simply put, they challenge the new approach to law that Horwitz identifies in early nineteenth-century America, claiming that much of
the uniqueness disappears when the older system is examined in
greater detail without slipping into the anachronism of using
twentieth-century methods to examine eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury law.10
Although the authors correctly emphasize their differences
from Professor Horwitz's instrumentalist view, Horwitz's work and
that of Nelson must be distinguished from theirs. The Constitution
and the Common Law must be judged as a study of public law and
of the application of private-law rules in a federal context that of
necessity injects public-law considerations into what otherwise
would be merely private-law cases. There can be no doubt that the
American Revolution, coupled with the implementation of two federal constitutions between 1781 and 1790, worked a significant
change in American public law. American constitutionalism was not
merely a branch of English public law; even before independence,
the proximity of separate provinces had created a need for serious
legal discussion of conflict of laws rules.1 The rise of colonial opposition to the Crown had been effectuated through the establishment
of various modes of cooperative effort, culminating in a union of
separate states with increasingly close constitutional ties with each
8. M. HoRwrrz, TI TRASFORAVON OF AMECANJ AW, 1780-1860, at 16-30(1977). For
review of the Horwitz volume, see Arnold, Book Review, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 241 (1977);
Gilmore, Book Review, 85 YALE L.J. 788 (1977); Bloomfield, Book Review, 30 VAD. L. REv.
1102 (1977). Professor Arnold comments that "much future energy will likely be expended
trying to catch Horwitz out" and that the idea that law should be responsible to social forces
has "a curiously twentieth century aura." 126 U. PA. L. REV. at 241-42 (1977).
9. BmDwEm & WHrrrmN, supra note 3, at 22.

10. Id. at 22-29.
11. Johnson, John Jay: Lawyer in a Time of Transition, 1764-1775, 124 U. PA. L. Rav.
1260, 1283-84 (1976).
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other. The Revolution also had generated a confidence in popularly
elected legislatures. The successful conduct of the war by a central
legislative government and by states dominated by strong legislative power had strengthened American affection for government by
positive acts of legislative power. In addition, the independence of
the judiciary had been a strong theme of the movement toward
revolution, leading one to suspect that American judges may well
have had second thoughts about their subordination to the will of
the legislative branch of government. 12 Indeed those second
thoughts may have been totally submerged in the evolution of the
principles of judicial review, first by the state courts, then by the
lower federal courts, and finally by the Supreme Court in Marbury
v. Madison. To suggest in this brief manner that American development from 1776 to 1800 altered the constitutional position of the
common-law judges is not to claim that their actions in private-law
cases necessarily were influenced by the change. The suggestion,
however, does emphasize the need to reconsider the issues of continuity and change in both public and private law betwen 1776 and
1860.
It is at the nexus of public law and private law-the diversity
jurisdiction of federal courts-that Bridwell and Whitten have chosen to labor. Carefully reading opinions of the Supreme Court and
of the lower federal courts, they spell out in gratifying detail the
contours of federal common law jurisdiction. The discussion is extremely perceptive and highlights the characteristic view of federal
judges that, in delineating diversity jurisdiction, federal courts must
act in conformity with the overall pattern of political and economic
federalism inherent in the Constitution. Thus, although state law
should be applied in most diversity cases (assuming that appropriate fixed rules were available for this purpose), it would violate the
constitutional concept of federalism to apply a state rule that reflected bias against noncitizens of the state. This was the very essence of diversity jurisdiction. 13 From this and numerous other examples, the authors conclude that no simple mechanism for the
selection of law, such as that enunciated in Erie, should be used by
modern federal courts in diversity cases, unless judges are willing
to ignore clear constitutional mandates to neutralize state bias
against nonresidents.
12. See G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMEuIcA REPuBLIc, 1776-1787, at 148-49 (1969);
Klein, Prelude to Revolution in New York: Jury Trials and JudicialTenure, 17 WM. & MARY
Q., 3d Ser., 439-62 (1960).
13. BPIDWEL & WHrrrm, supra note 3, at 11-12, 29-33, 75-76, 81, 105, 131.
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Although Bridwell and Whitten argue in favor of the legitimate
exercise of federal common-law jurisdiction, given the nineteenthcentury view of the Constitution and federalism, they are far from
concurring with Professor Crosskey's position that Congress originally was intended to be a supreme legislature and that the Supreme Court was expected to be the judicial head of the United
States. 4 Rather they plead the more limited, and more plausible,
hypothesis that within the limitations of federalism and separation
of powers, federal common-law jurisdiction was exercised more in
the nineteenth century than it is today under the Erie doctrine. 5
Under the federal constitution, the common law conferred no jurisdiction upon the lower federal courts; that was solely dependent
upon constitutional or legislative grant. On the other hand, when
the extra-territorial nature of the underlying transaction or the subject matter gave rise to relevant legal issues beyond state lines,
federal courts might seek and apply rules of common law from the
sources of local custom, general custom, and precedent that were
available to them. Federalism required the development of an independent conflict of laws theory and an independent common-law
function in federal tribunals when the need arose in diversity cases
to protect the rights of nonresidents."6 Separation of powers, on the
other hand, sharply limited the ability of federal courts to apply
common-law rules when there was no reservoir of custom or precedent upon which to draw. Thus, although the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Hudson 7 decreed that there was
no federal common law of crimes and that no indictments would lie
except as they were based upon statutes, common-law rules were
found and developed on the civil side, for example, in admiralty
litigation.'8
Most convincing are the authors' conclusions concerning jurisdiction, their analysis of styles of decisionmaking in the diversity
context, and their appreciation of the impact of federalism and
separation of powers as factors limiting the jurisdiction and jurisprudence of federal judges. In other areas, such as the development
of commercial law in federal courts, the evidence seems to fit well
into the hypothesis that decisions were shaped to conform to the
reasonable anticipations of the parties and to neutralize the possi14.
(1953).
15.
16.
17.

W. CROSSKEY, PoL-cs AND THE CONSTrrunoN IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

BminwL.L & WHrrTEN, supra note 3, at xiii.
Id. at 77-81.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 31 (1812).
18. BnrDwEL, & WHnrEN, supra note 3, at 37-60.
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bility of locally biased rules of law. Yet on balance, there are suggestions in the early case law of the Supreme Court that should lead
us to pause before fully accepting the Bridwell-Whitten thesis.
In effectuating the economic goals of the federal consitution,
the Supreme Court spelled out the doctrines of sanctity of contract
and vested property rights. These workhorse doctrines of constitutional law, of course, are best exemplified by Fletcher v. Peck'9 and
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"4 which are elementary applications of federal protections under the contract clause.
On the other hand, in Huidekoper's Lessee v. Douglass21the Court
did not place its reliance upon the contract clause, but rather upon
the principle of promissory estoppel in striking down what it considered to be an extraordinary application of state legislative power
and ignoring the construction of a Pennsylvania statute by the highest court of the state. In FletcherChief Justice Marshall spelled out
the common law on the power of states to annul grants of title to
real property and suggested that it existed apart from the power of
the federal government, which under the federal constitution was
bound to protect them.2 2 Similarly, in Fairfax'sDevisee v. Hunter's
Lessee4 Justice Story applied English common-law procedures to
state sequestration of alien estates, both as a limitation upon state
action and as an inherent part of the common law of the American
colonies and states.
Sustaining the federal government's right of preference under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800 in United States v. Fisher,2-Chief Justice Marshall found his justification in the power of Congress to
adopt provisions to ensure the ability of the federal government to
collect sums payable to the public treasury.21 Marshall's alter ego,
Justice Washington, dissented from the majority opinion, contending that the government's preference would make uncertain the
property rights of individuals and undermine the stability of private
commercial transactions. 26 This and similar cases illustrate a
changed emphasis in jurisprudence at a relatively early date.
Clearly, as Bridwell and Whitten argue, whenever possible, the federal courts attempted to satisfy the expectations of the parties, and
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 48 (1810).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 250 (1819).
7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 1 (1805).
10 U.S. at 77.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 603 (1813).

24.

6 U.S. (2 Cranch.) 358 (1804).

25.
26.

Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
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yet it is also clear that as far as federal jurisprudence was concerned,
matters of public policy and a need for judicial positivism asserted
an influence over the decisionmaking of the federal judges.
In filing a caveat against the major thesis of The Constitution
and the Common Law, this reviewer should not be taken as detracting from the importance of the work as a fresh insight and major
reinterpretation of the legal and constitutional history of federal law
from 1789 to the Civil War. This book does much to illustrate the
danger of reading nineteenth-century history through the dark
glasses of twentieth-century assumptions concerning the nature and
application of law. At the same time, closer historiographic attention needs to be devoted to the influence that an altered public law
after 1776 had upon the development of private law in the American
states and the federal courts. In posing this challenge to the legal
historians working in the field, the authors have made their most
valuable contribution.
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